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2Synesthesia vs. Crossmodal
Illusions
Casey O’Callaghan
2.1 Two opposing perspectives on synesthesia
We can discern two opposing viewpoints regarding synesthesia. On one hand,
to borrow from Harrison’s (2001) book title, synesthesia is “The Strangest
Thing.” It is an oddity, an outlier, or a disordered condition. A history of skepticism
questions whether it even exists. It has been described as “incredible,” “controver-
sial,” “mysterious,” “unbelievable,” and “romantic neurology.” On the other hand,
synesthesia is touted as pervasive. It is the heart of nearly any distinctively human
cognitive achievement. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001, 2003a,b), for example,
suggest that synesthesia helps explain metaphor, creativity, and the origins of
language itself.
Which is it? Ultimately, I favor the ﬁrst perspective, according to which cross-
sensory synesthesia is an outlying condition. But the second perspective is not
wholly misguided. My discussion has three lessons. First, synesthesia is just one of a
variety of effects in which one sense modality causally impacts and reshapes
experience associated with another. These effects are utterly common. However,
due to their unfamiliarity and their conﬂict with a widespread conception of the
role of the senses in perception and perceptual experience, until recently they have
been surprising. Second, synesthesia nevertheless must be distinguished from
other intermodal effects that lead to misperception, such as crossmodal illusions.
Third, synesthesia also may be distinguished from the potentially much broader
class of synesthetic effects, which could be common across the population and
within individuals.
Section 2.2 characterizes synesthesia, section 2.3 characterizes crossmodal illusions,
and section 2.4 contrasts synesthesia with crossmodal illusions. Section 2.5 contrasts
synesthesia with synesthetic effects and presents a conciliatory take on the two
viewpoints concerning synesthesia.
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2.2 Cross-sensory synesthesia
Stereotypical synesthesia involves stimulation to one sensory system that gives rise to
an experience of a type that is typically associated with another sensory modality.
This concurrent experience generally is not a case of veridical perception.
Synesthesia has numerous varieties. Some are familiar. Synesthetes may have color
experiences in response to sounds or sound experiences in response to visible colors.
They may experience graphemes as colored, or days of the week or months of the
year as occupying speciﬁc locations in space around the body. Other forms of
synesthesia are striking. Some synesthetes have tactual or bodily sensations when
hearing sounds, or speciﬁc taste experiences in response to visible letters or graph-
emes. Some experience distinctive textural attributes that are prompted by tastes and
ﬂavors. The examples multiply.1
Contrary to earlier skepticism, current evidence shows that synesthesia exists, that
it sometimes manifests as a conscious phenomenon, and that it may involve robust
qualitative phenomenology. For instance, grapheme–color synesthesia can generate
Stroop interference. It can also improve response times in visual search tasks.
However, search times generally do increase with display complexity, so search
remains serial rather than parallel, and the effect is not strong enough to support
robust popout. Moreover, synesthetic experiences may require focal attention and
thus be incapable of capturing exogenous attention. Nevertheless, the most convin-
cing evidence in support of synesthesia is that synesthetes, when compared with
non-synesthetes, are remarkably consistent on matching tasks through a great many
trials distributed over long periods of time. Synesthetes more accurately match
synesthetic concurrents prompted by a particular stimulus than memory should
allow. For instance, time after time, year after year, a synesthete might match just
the same shade of blue to the letter “G.”2
How should we characterize synesthesia? As a ﬁrst pass, we might say that
synesthesia occurs when stimulation to one sensory system causes an experience of
a type or with a character that is usually associated with another sensory modality.
For instance, according to Harrison (2001), “Synaesthesia is a confusion of the senses,
whereby stimulation of one sense triggers stimulation in a completely different sensory
modality.”Wager (1999: 264) says, “According to the standard deﬁnition, synaesthesia
is a condition in which stimulation of one sensory modality automatically produces an
additional experience typical of another, unstimulated sensory modality.” And,
according to Harrison and Baron-Cohen (1997: 66), synesthesia occurs, “when
stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers a perception in a second
modality, in the absence of any direct stimulation to this second modality.”
1 For an overview, see, e.g., Baron-Cohen and Harrison (1997); Cytowic (2002); Cytowic and Eagleman
(2009). On sound–touch synesthesia, see Beauchamp and Ro (2008).
2 See, e.g., Eagleman et al. (2007).
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Macpherson (2007: 66, note 8) quotes this characterization and observes, “This
deﬁnition is widely cited in the literature.”
There are several things to note about this sort of characterization. First, it assumes
that we have a good grasp on what it is for an experience or its character to be in, of,
or associated with a given sensory modality. Since my topic is neither the individu-
ation of sensory modalities nor the typing of experiences or their phenomenology by
modality, I’ll simply presuppose in what follows that an account typing experiences
by sensory modality is feasible.
Second, it assumes that the synesthetic concurrent is in or of the unstimulated
modality, rather than in or of the stimulated modality, or in or of no determinate
modality at all. Auvray and Deroy (2015) provide a valuable discussion of why this
assumption is suspect as it stands. Thus, for the sake of discussion, I’ll reinterpret the
claim that the synesthetic concurrent is in or of the unstimulated modality as the
claim that it involves an experience as of a given quality or feature that is of an
experiential type whose instances typically occur through stimulation of that modal-
ity rather than the inducer.
Third, there is a great deal of variety in how synesthetic experiences manifest—in
their intensity and in their qualitative and phenomenological character. To take an
example, there is a longstanding debate between researchers who think there are
projectors and associators and those who think there are simply localizers and
nonlocalizers. While this debate concerns the nature of synesthetic experiences,
both parties agree that some synesthetes experience qualitative features as located
in distal space and that some synesthetes do not.
Given this variety, we may distinguish what I’ll dub “philosophical synesthesia”
from other sorts of synesthesia. Say that a synesthetically induced experience is a case
of philosophical synesthesia just in case it is qualitatively indistinguishable from
having a typical perceptual experience as of the instantiation of the relevant feature.
For instance, philosophical grapheme–color synesthesia might involve having per-
ceptual experiences that are phenomenologically or introspectively indistinguishable
from seeing a red “8.” Synesthesia need not be philosophical synesthesia. For instance,
imagery, vivid or diffuse, may sufﬁce.
Fourth, synesthesia need not involve two distinct sensory modalities. For instance,
the stimulus or trigger might not be to a sensory system at all. Thinking about a
number could be enough to trigger a color experience, as could an affective or
emotional stimulus. Even the familiarity of a face can trigger synesthetic color
experiences. Moreover, synesthesia commonly involves only one sense modality.
For example, low-level grapheme–color synesthesia involves vision alone, and thus
is intra-sensory. So, synesthesia is not necessarily cross-sensory. It has more to do
with a lack of stimulation of the appropriate variety.
Hubbard (2007: 193) thus says that synesthesia occurs when “stimulation in
one sensory or cognitive stream leads to associated experiences in a second, unstimu-
lated stream.” Similarly, Brogaard (2012) says, “Synesthesia is a condition in which
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stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily, or automatically, leads
to associated internal or external (illusory or hallucinatory) experiences in a second
unstimulated sensory or cognitive system.” Wikipedia (November 27, 2014) even
characterizes synesthesia as “a neurological phenomenon in which stimulation of one
sensory or cognitive pathway leads to automatic, involuntary experiences in a second
sensory or cognitive pathway.”
Since I want to contrast synesthesia with other crossmodal effects that involve
misperception, I’ll simply restrict the discussion that follows to cross-sensory
varieties of synesthesia.
2.3 Crossmodal illusions
Consider a related class of effects in which stimulation to one sensory system affects
experience that is associated with another sensory modality in a way that leads to
illusion. A crossmodal perceptual illusion is a case in which activity in one sensory
system causally impacts processes associated with another sensory system and
thereby generates a non-veridical perceptual experience. Seeing can make you have
illusory tactual impressions, and hearing can cause visual illusions. Stimulation to
one sense can impact processes and alter experiences associated with another sense.
Interactions of this sort are rampant, and they sometimes lead to illusions.
Ventriloquism, for instance, involves an illusory auditory perceptual experience of
spatial location that is caused by the visible location of an apparent sound source.
Ventriloquism is best known from the case of hearing a puppeteer “throw” a voice,
and many people are surprised to learn that ventriloquism does not involve throwing
sound. Instead, it involves auditorily experiencing a voice illusorily as coming from
the place where a dummy is seen. The ventriloquist effect does not require speech.
The minimal ﬂash of a dot can impact where you auditorily experience a concurrent
beep to come from. The effect is neither inferential nor cognitive, but results from
crossmodal perceptual interactions.3 Similarly, the rubber hand illusion involves
visual capture of proprioceptive location. This is a case in which a touch to a rubber
hand is felt as a touch to one’s own hand. However, the rubber hand illusion also
involves a proprioceptive location illusion induced by vision. Seeing a rubber hand,
or even a prismatically displaced image of your hand, illusorily shifts where you feel
your hand to be.4
So, visual stimulation readily leads to illusory spatial experiences that are associ-
ated with other sense modalities. However, crossmodal illusions occur for features
other than space, and other modalities can affect visual experience. For instance,
audition impacts temporal characteristics of visual experience in a way that leads to
3 See Bertelson (1999); Vroomen et al. (2001).
4 Hay et al. (1965); Pick et al. (1969). See Botvinick and Cohen (1998) for the illusion of a felt touch on
the hand caused by vision.
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illusion. The start of a sound can alter when a light seems to switch on, so that the
light’s onset seems synchronous with the sound’s. A sound’s duration can alter the
apparent duration of a visual stimulus. A quick beep can make a moving visible target
appear to freeze. Sound can also alter visually apparent rate and even temporal
order.5 So, the tempting hypothesis that vision wins or dominates whenever there’s
a conﬂict is false. In fact, crossmodal illusions are far more widespread, and the
combinations defy intuition. In the parchment skin illusion, hearing a crinkling
sound alters the apparent felt texture of a surface.6 Crunching sounds can affect
the apparent ﬂavor of potato chips.7 Smell not only alters taste, as in sweetness
enhancement, but it even inﬂuences vision under conditions of binocular rivalry.8
Speech perception presents particularly compelling crossmodal illusions, including
the McGurk effect.9 When presented with the sound of the bilabial /ba/, pronounced
with the lips together, along with incongruent video of a speaker articulating the velar /
ga/, pronounced with the tongue at the back of the palette, many listeners report
experiencing clearly the sound of the alveolar /da/, pronounced with the tongue near
the front of the palette. The presence of the visible speaker leads to an illusory sound
experience. Moreover, one modality can inﬂuence causal impressions associated with
another. Consider the motion-bounce effect.10 Two disks on a screen that traverse
crossing diagonal paths most frequently look to subjects to stream past one another.
But a sound played when the disks intersect makes the disks most frequently appear
to visibly bounce and rebound from one another. Finally, consider a fascinating
crossmodal illusion discovered by Shams et al. (2000, 2002). In the sound-induced
ﬂash illusion, presenting two beeps along with a single ﬂash causes subjects to
perceptually experience not just two beeps but also two ﬂashes: “A single ﬂash
accompanied by multiple beeps is perceived as multiple ﬂashes. This phenomenon
clearly demonstrates that sound can alter the visual percept qualitatively even when
there is no ambiguity in the visual stimulus” (Shams et al., 2002: 152). The sound-
induced ﬂash effect involves a phenomenological change to the character of visual
experience that is produced by audition. It results from crossmodal perceptual
mechanisms. It is a visual perceptual illusion caused by audible sounds.
Crossmodal perceptual illusions involve stimulation to one sensory system that
illusorily impacts perceptual experience that is associated with another sensory
modality. The effects I’ve described are just a selection from a rapidly expanding
body of experimental research that charts the interactions among the senses. Recent
ﬁndings from psychophysics and neural science demonstrate that crossmodal effects
are widespread and common. These results show that processes connected with one
5 See, e.g.,Vroomen and de Gelder (2000). 6 Jousmäki and Hari (1998); Guest et al. (2002).
7 Zampini and Spence (2004).
8 See Zhou et al. (2010, 2012). See also Smith (2015) for discussion of other crossmodal effects involving
chemical senses.
9 McGurk and MacDonald (1976). 10 Sekuler et al. (1997).
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sensory system impact processes connected with others. Information from one
sense can change how another responds. Such results help establish that the extero-
ceptive modalities of sensory perception are not causally isolated and informationally
encapsulated.11
2.4 Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions
What is the relationship between synesthesia and crossmodal illusions? Synesthesia
belongs to a broad class of effects in which one sense modality causally impacts
another. Such ﬁndings might be thought to support the point of view according to
which synesthesia is pervasive. For instance, both cross-sensory synesthesia and
crossmodal illusions occur when stimulation to one sensory system impacts and
alters experience associated with another sense modality in a way that leads to
illusion or hallucination. As with synesthesia, subjects differ in whether and to
what extent they are susceptible to crossmodal illusions. Like synesthesia, crossmodal
illusions occur for a variety of features, including space, time, texture, phonemes,
number, and sound. Like synesthesia, crossmodal illusions vary in intensity and
quality. Some, such as the McGurk effect, are strong and robust; others, such as the
sound-induced ﬂash, are fragile, with an elusive quality. Like synesthesia, cross-
modal illusions are surprising because they conﬂict with a widespread conception
according to which the senses are explanatorily independent modes of awareness
and domains of inquiry. Uncovering such a pattern of crossmodal illusions might
be supposed to provide evidence that synesthetic effects are more widespread than
otherwise imagined.
I want to deﬂect this line of thought. It is crucial to distinguish typical crossmodal
perceptual illusions and recalibrations from synesthesia and synesthetic effects.
Doing so illuminates why synesthesia is an outlier—a kind of experiential quirk—
rather than a condition that reveals something fundamental about the nature of
multisensory perception. Properly understanding the more typical varieties of cross-
modal effects suggests that our interest in synesthesia has been exaggerated. If we
hope to understand the types of mechanisms that ground multisensory perception,
and what they reveal about the nature and function of perceptual awareness, cross-
modal illusions are more revealing.
First of all, synesthesia is rare. Synesthesia that involves rich qualitative sensory
phenomenology occurs in roughly one in 2,000 persons, according to Baron-Cohen
et al. (1996). Simner et al. (2006) put the rate much higher, at roughly one in twenty.
Even at the higher rate, synesthesia is an atypical condition, occurring in a small
minority. Crossmodal illusions, however, are utterly common across the population.
11 See, e.g., Shimojo and Shams (2001).
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Within individuals, synesthetic effects are relatively isolated and are usually
limited to a small range of speciﬁc feature types. Crossmodal perceptual illusions,
on the other hand, are widespread across a range of different cases and domains.
There are crossmodal effects involving vision, hearing, touch, proprioception, smell,
and gustation. These may involve spatial, temporal, numerical, causal, or linguistic
features, among others.
More to the point, synesthesia is an experiential quirk that results from highly
contingent facts about sensory wiring or a speciﬁc subject’s environment. It is caused
by accidental, uninhibited, or counternormative causal interaction enabled by the
connectedness or mere proximity of otherwise functionally distinct brain regions and
pathways, or by statistical anomalies in a pattern of stimulation.12
In synesthesia, stimulation to one sense generates an experience as of a feature
which is of a type that you need not otherwise have experienced. And stimulation to
the inducer sufﬁces to generate the concurrent experience. For instance, hearing a
sound sufﬁces to generate a color experience without the relevant visual stimulation.
In one important respect, then, synesthetically induced experiences are inappro-
priate. The triggering stimulus does not provide reliable information about the
synesthetically experienced feature. Synesthesia tends to involve no stimulation of a
sort that is correlated with the presence of the determinate feature that is experienced
as the synesthetic concurrent. The process responsible for synesthesia does not
enable synesthetes literally to hear colors or to taste roughness. There is no reliable
connection between the colors of things and the colors a synesthete experiences
as a result of hearing sounds. Things usually just lack the determinate qualities
synesthetic experiences attribute. A sound–color synesthete’s color experiences may
track the disjunctive property of having color or pitch. But this itself does not enhance
the reliability of either color or pitch experience in the absence of further inference.
Crossmodal illusions, however, are not merely aberrations or quirks of processing
that stem from accidental interference. In crossmodal illusions, stimulation to one
sense alters or reshapes an experience you otherwise would have through a different
sense. For instance, the visual stimulus reshapes your auditory experience of a
phoneme, and two beeps affect the apparent number of visible ﬂashes you see. But
stimulation to one sense alone does not sufﬁce to generate a crossmodal illusion.
Seeing a talker does not sufﬁce to auditorily experience a phoneme, and hearing a
beep does not sufﬁce to visually experience a ﬂash.
Moreover, in one important respect, crossmodal illusions are appropriate. The
triggering stimulus is of a type that generally provides reliable information about the
illusorily experienced feature. For instance, vision normally affords good information
about the location of your hand. Audition typically is reliable when it comes to the
12 Beauchamp and Ro (2008) discuss a case of stroke-induced synesthesia. For fascinating discussion of
learned grapheme–color synesthesia that conforms to the colors of popular Fisher-Price toy letters,
see Witthoft and Winawer (2013).
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temporal features of happenings in your environment. Visible mouth movements
provide informative clues about vocal gestures. Thus, crossmodal perceptual illusions
are intelligible responses to unusual or extraordinary circumstances. The visible
source of a sound does not often diverge from where the sound seems to be.
Visible events in time usually do correspond in number to their acoustic signs.
And visible mouth movements and audible sounds do not typically disagree about
the phonemes a speaker utters. Paradigmatic crossmodal recalibrations and illusions
thus involve reconciling conﬂicting information across sensory systems. As a general
principle, reconciling conﬂicting information across the senses is a good strategy.
Under unusual conditions, it leads to illusion.
Crossmodal biases and recalibrations in fact do help to improve perceptual
responses by making use of information from multiple sensory sources. Under a
range of normal conditions, vision’s impact on other modalities concerning spatial
features serves a variety of purposes. In the ﬁrst instance, crossmodal processes can
help to deal with simple physical facts, such as that the light from an event arrives
earlier than the sound waves, or that a neural signal takes longer to reach your brain
from your foot than from your eye since it must travel farther. Crossmodal inter-
actions can help reconcile temporally offset signals when it is unlikely that they
reﬂect asynchronous sources. Crossmodal processes thus deal with conﬂicting infor-
mation, but they also resolve ambiguity, improve precision, and correct perceptual
errors stemming from a given sense modality. Such conﬂict, ambiguity, imprecision,
and error can stem from differences in format, perspective, resolving power, accuracy,
or noisiness of sensory stimulation in different modalities. For instance, vision’s
spatial resolution capacity is an order of magnitude greater than audition’s. So, the
fact that vision can override audition enhances our capacity to perceive spatial
features. Similarly, audition’s temporal resolution far exceeds vision’s, so the fact
that audition can override vision improves perception of temporal characteristics. As
a result, crossmodal processes commonly help to avoid illusions, as when vision
corrects a front-back confusion in auditory localization, which stems from a limita-
tion inherent to audition. They also improve perceptual accuracy, as when visual
information enhances auditory phoneme discrimination.
Crossmodal illusions thus are accidentally illusory. They involve the deployment
of perceptual strategies that lead to non-illusory experiences when applied across a
wide range of typical circumstances. Such strategies help compensate for and smooth
out differences in timing, perceptual ambiguities, and inaccuracies. These strategies
sometimes lead to illusions—as when experimenters artiﬁcially introduce discrepan-
cies, when perception mistakenly resolves a real-world discrepancy, or when percep-
tion leaves intact a discrepancy that should be resolved. But these illusions are
intelligible and explicable in accordance with general regularities that enhance
perception in multisensory contexts. Crossmodal illusions result from intermodal
organizing strategies, principles, or rules that regularly help us to get things right.
Crossmodal perceptual illusions are principled perceptual responses—in general,
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they predictably conform to strategies that improve the capacity to perceive for
creatures like us in typical environments. For instance, in typical intermodal recali-
bration, information from different senses is weighted according to the relative
reliability of its sources (this is evident in the McGurk effect). Such strategies are
straightforwardly intelligible as conferring a perceptual advantage. The leading
hypothesis is that crossmodal recalibrations enhance the overall reliability of perception.
Altogether these ﬁndings suggest that in carrying out basic perceptual tasks, the human
perceptual system performs causal inference and multisensory integration, and it does so in
a fashion highly consistent with a Bayesian observer. This strategy is statistically optimal as it
leads to minimizing the average (squared) error of perceptual estimates; however, it results in
errors in some conditions, which manifest themselves as illusions.
(Shams and Kim, 2010: 280)
Synesthesia, in contrast, is robustly or persistently illusory. It involves experiences
conjured from whole cloth.13 Synesthesia is typically unprincipled. It does not result
frommore general perceptual strategies for dealing with the world that are realized in
other multisensory contexts. It does not typically stem from broader regularities that
help to overcome perceptual limitations, inaccuracies, or ambiguities. Unlike ordinary
crossmodal biases and recalibrations that sometimes lead to illusion, synesthesia is not
in this way intelligible as adaptive. It is accidentally beneﬁcial. That is, the beneﬁts it
confers do not come from its implementing strategies that enhance perceptual reli-
ability. Mnemonic, learning, and aesthetic enhancements, for instance, stem from
associations or characteristics internal to experience rather than from improvements
to perceptual resolution or accuracy.
To summarize, the sound-induced ﬂash illusion and a battery of other cases show
that the predisposition toward intermodal perceptual recalibration and reconciliation
in typical human perceivers is strong. That effects such as crossmodal biasing and
recalibration are so prevalent across multisensory contexts suggests that crossmodal
illusions are neither aberrations nor mere quirks that stem from mere accidents or
miscuing. Instead, they are intelligible responses to unusual or atypical circumstances.
13 Macpherson (2007) suggests that the distinction between crossmodal illusions and synesthesia
depends on the difference between illusion and hallucination. According to the standard philosophical
understanding, illusion involves perceiving an object but misperceiving its features, and hallucination
involves failing to perceive an object at all. On this conception, synesthesia is not necessarily hallucinatory.
In many cases, synesthetes perceive an object but misperceive its features. For instance, a synesthete might
see a grapheme but misattribute some color to it. Perhaps, however, this should be understood as involving
an attribute or property hallucination rather than mere illusion. This would require developing and
appealing to an independently motivated conception of an attribute or property hallucination. One way
to characterize the distinction between property illusion and hallucination is to appeal to determinables
and determinates. In property illusion, you perceive some determinable feature but misperceive its
determinate value; in property hallucination, you fail to perceive the relevant determinable. Nevertheless,
being hallucinatory does not appear to sufﬁce for being a case of synesthesia. The sound-induced ﬂash
effect, a crossmodal illusion, may involve hallucinating at least one visually apparent event. Perhaps,
however, it involves illusorily perceiving an event’s numerosity. Given these obstacles, I won’t rely on this
way of drawing the distinction.
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In contrast with synesthesia, which is not as a rule the result of general perceptual
strategies that enable typical human subjects to better perceive features in the world,
crossmodal illusions stem from perceptual strategies that are readily intelligible as
adaptive and advantageous. Crossmodal illusions result from intermodal processes
that conform to multisensory principles or regularities that enhance the reliability of
perception. In resolving conﬂicts, they demonstrate a perceptual concern for the
common sources of stimulation to multiple sense modalities. The experimental results
show that such multisensory organizing principles apply quite generally. They apply
across various sets of sense modalities, and they concern a wide range of features.
They constrain multisensory perception even under ordinary conditions when con-
ﬂict and ambiguity are absent and no recalibration occurs. Crossmodal perceptual
interactions thus reveal that multisensory processes are widespread and shape the
organization and character of perceptual awareness in typical human subjects.
Synesthesia generally does not. (See Table 2.1.)
2.5 Synesthesia and synesthesis
I began with two opposing perspectives on synesthesia. According to one, synesthesia
is “the strangest thing.” According to the other, synesthesia is pervasive. The con-
siderations described here favor the ﬁrst. Synesthesia differs in a number of diagnos-
tic respects from common crossmodal interactions, including those that lead to
illusion. It thus should be distinguished from those more typical crossmodal effects
as an outlier.
Nonetheless, this discussion suggests a conciliatory position. Viewed in the right
light, synesthesia is not an outlier of a wholly distinctive variety. It belongs to the
extensive class of crossmodal phenomena. In particular, synesthesia is one among
many effects in which stimulation to one sensory system has a relatively immediate
impact upon experience that is typically associated with another sense modality.
Table 2.1. Synesthesia vs. crossmodal illusions.
Synesthesia Crossmodal illusions
uncommon common
isolated widespread
quirky not quirky
generates alters
sufﬁces doesn’t sufﬁce
inappropriate appropriate
principled unprincipled
accidentally beneﬁcial robustly beneﬁcial
robustly illusory accidentally illusory
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This broader family of crossmodal effects includes crossmodal illusions, as well as
accuracy-enhancing recalibrations, biasing, resolution of ambiguity, and cuing of
attention. Synesthesia may even share certain inter-sensory mechanisms with typical
crossmodal interactions. Crossmodal interactions among senses are surprising and
may strike us as odd because they conﬂict with central aspects of historically
prevalent commonsense, philosophical, and scientiﬁc conceptions, according to
which the senses are explanatorily independent modes of awareness and domains
for inquiry.
To be clear, however, synesthesia is not an utterly pervasive phenomenon. Instead,
it involves an uncommon overproliferation of crossmodal inﬂuence. When operating
in the usual manner, crossmodal interactions are straightforwardly intelligible as
advantageous and as adaptive perceptual capacities. In synesthesia, cross-sensory
effects occur in a manner that is untethered from the requisite regularities that
generally hold between features experienced through differing senses. The resulting
synesthetic experiences thus systematically fail to accurately reﬂect one’s surroundings.
As a result, synesthesia lacks an obvious world-revealing beneﬁt or an enhancement
to perceptual accuracy or reliability. Nevertheless, synesthesia may confer contingent
beneﬁts, such as learning, memory, aesthetic, and creative enhancements. For
instance, Watson et al. (2012b,a, 2014) propose a novel account according to which
synesthetic associations are remnants of complex childhood learning tasks in which
they assisted. But such beneﬁts are due primarily to qualitative features inherent in
synesthetic experiences. Thus, on balance, I concur with the important separatist
lesson of Deroy and Spence (2013), who distinguish synesthesia from crossmodal
correspondences and thus argue that we are not all even weak synesthetes.
Of course, there could be far more typical crossmodal effects that share central
characteristics with synesthesia and that are not best understood as crossmodal
perceptual illusions. And such effects could be intelligible as perceptually adaptive.
An experience of one sense might be enough to trigger an appropriate experience
associated with another sense. For instance, seeing visible vocal gestures might sufﬁce
on an occasion to generate auditory imagery associated with the speech sounds that
normally accompany those gestures.14 Or audition could cause appropriate tactual
experiences, as perhaps occurs when hearing ﬁngernails or metal on slate. These
could be relatively direct crossmodal effects. We can even imagine cases in which the
induced phenomenology is sufﬁciently vivid and effectively externalized. We can
imagine that the induced experience in fact is a reliable guide in most human subjects
to audible or tactual features that are present but that otherwise would go unheard or
unfelt. There could be such widespread, reliable crossmodal enhancements. And, in
principle, creatures could evolve to make use of them.
14 See, e.g., Calvert et al. (1997). For an example involving musical notation, see also Brodsky et al.
(2003). For a useful, relevant review of auditory imagery, see Hubbard (2010).
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According to my characterization, such synesthetic crossmodal enhancements
would not count as synesthesia. Instead, I recommend that we go further and
distinguish synesthesia from synesthetic effects. Any cross-sensory synesthetic effect
is one in which stimulation to one sense modality sufﬁces to cause or to generate an
experience with phenomenal character that is associated with a perceptual experi-
ence typical of another sense modality. Synesthesia, however, is a condition in
which this type of process occurs consistently and counternormatively, and which
involves systematic illusion that is only ever accidentally veridical. Thus, there
could be synesthetic effects without synesthesia. It remains highly speculative to
claim that outside synesthesia there actually exist robust synesthetic effects that
impact the phenomenal character of experience in a manner that is associated with
the affected sensory modality. Induced imagery currently provides the most intri-
guing examples.
Given the contrast with typical crossmodal perceptual illusions (or even merely
potential reliable synesthetic effects), synesthesia pales. Just as visual illusions
illuminate the principles of vision and the structure of visual awareness, crossmodal
illusions help us to elucidate intermodal organizing principles and the structure of
multisensory awareness. Plain crossmodal perceptual illusions and recalibrations
teach us more about the nature, character, and function of perceptual awareness
than their more attention-grabbing relatives with the wild qualia.
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